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Abstract Drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s adherence to
existential phenomenology, the article advances a political
understanding and interpretation of community organizing.
Arendt, it is maintained, offers valuable insight into polit-
ical phenomena which are constitutive of community
organizing. Four aspects, in particular, are highlighted—
what I refer to as the four ‘‘A’’s of association, action,
appearance and authenticity—understood in existentialist,
phenomenological, ontological and ultimately political
terms, as primary ways of being-together-politically. The
first part of the article examines Arendt’s existential phe-
nomenological approach in shaping her understanding of
the political. This provides the theoretical basis for exam-
ining in the second part of the article, phenomena which
are constitutive of community organizing, highlighting
how association, action, appearance and authenticity form
distinctive political characteristics of community organiz-
ing as an approach. At different points, brief reference is
made to the work of London Citizens, the largest broad-
based organization in the UK, in order to illustrate the
connections between Arendtian thought and community-
based organizing.
Keywords Community organizing  Arendt 
Phenomenology  Politics  The political
Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the
thinking of Hannah Arendt and its relevance to under-
standing the nature of contemporary political life (Bern-
stein, 2018). In the field of community organizing
specifically, there is a small but growing body of literature
dedicated to a critical appraisal and application of Arendt’s
ideas on themes such as action, power and the nature of the
political (Boyte, 2010; Bretherton, 2015; Bunyan,
2010, 2013; May, 2018). This article seeks to add to this
literature. It is posited that in applying an Arendtian lens
from an existentialist phenomenological perspective, sig-
nificant insight is afforded into, amongst other things, the
meaning and political nature of community organizing, the
intersubjective and relational basis of the approach and into
phenomena which are constitutive of human agency and
‘‘the political’’, more generally.
In setting out Arendt’s significance to an understanding
of the political nature of community organizing, the first
part of the article examines Arendt’s existentialist phe-
nomenological approach in shaping her understanding of
the political. The ‘‘political difference’’—the distinction
between ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘the political’’—employed in post-
foundational thought, is posited as an important starting
point for thinking about the nature of the political in
relation to community organizing. Arising from this dis-
tinction, two concepts, shaped by Arendt’s phenomeno-
logical interpretation of ‘‘the political’’, are examined; first,
the notion of the associative political, recognized in post-
foundational thought as the Arendtian trait (Marchart,
2007); and second Arendt’s notion of plurality as the basis
of political intersubjectivity (Loidolt, 2018). This provides
the theoretical basis for examining in the second part of the
article, phenomena (the four ‘‘A’’s) which are constitutive
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of community organizing, highlighting how association,
action, appearance and authenticity as ways of Being-to-
gether-politically, form the distinctive political basis and
character of community organizing as an approach. The
main aim in the article is to provide a theoretical per-
spective on community organizing but at different points
brief reference is made to the work of London Citizens, the
largest broad-based organization in the UK, in order to
illustrate the connections between Arendtian thought and
community-based organizing.
There are many variations of community organizing but
in the context of this article it refers essentially to the
approach pioneered by Saul Alinsky in the USA in the
1940s aimed at building political agency and redefining
relationships of power within society. For over three dec-
ades from the 1940s, Alinsky built a reputation as one of
America’s most controversial and radical organizers,
credited with changing urban politics and influencing
future leaders, including President Barack Obama and
Hillary Clinton. In the 1940s Alinsky established the
Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) to promote community
organizing across the USA. The IAF remains today at the
forefront of community organizing, working in more than
60 cities across the USA and with affiliates in Australia,
Canada, Germany and the UK. To avoid repetition the term
‘‘community organizing’’ will for the most part be abbre-
viated to CO for the remainder of the article.
Arendt and the Existential Phenomenological
Tradition
Arendt referred to herself as a political theorist and for
much of her academic life rejected the term philosopher.
Her unease towards philosophy stemmed from both her
personal experience as a Jew and her scholarly activity as a
philosophy graduate in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s.
Arendt couldn’t fathom how some members of the German
academy, at the forefront of the philosophical world, failed
to recognize and criticize the atrocities of National
Socialism. Most notable amongst these was Martin Hei-
degger, her former teacher and lover. Seeing the ‘‘‘pro-
fessional thinkers’ get lost in the ivory tower of thought,
while the world was falling apart politically’’ (Fry,
2009:35), created in Arendt a deep frustration with tradi-
tional philosophy. The contrast between philosophy, the
vita contemplativa, and politics, the vita activa, was to
constitute a central and recurring theme throughout
Arendt’s work and scholarly career (Dolan, 2000).
Despite her frustration, Arendt was greatly influenced by
the German philosophical tradition, particularly in its
existentialist and phenomenological forms. Existentialism
is a philosophical and literary movement that came to
prominence in Europe in the mid-twentieth century, most
closely associated with the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.
The movement’s antecedents, however, go back to the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, influenced by the
ideas of, amongst others, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl
and Heidegger, albeit the term ‘‘existentialism’’ itself was
not used by any of these philosophers. As the name sug-
gests, existentialism is concerned with fundamental themes
and aspects of human existence, including, amongst other
things freedom, death, finitude and authenticity (Reynolds,
2006). Arendt’s particular existential interest lay in inter-
preting the meaning of plurality as a human phenomenon
and how this informed understanding of the nature of the
political.
The term ‘‘existential phenomenology’’ highlights the
indebtedness of the so-called existentialist philosophers to
the phenomenological project started by Edmund Husserl
in the early twentieth century. In broad terms, phe-
nomenology is an interpretive research approach which
emerged out of a reaction to positivism. According to
Willis (2001:3), it sought to steer a middle path ‘‘between
objectifying views that posit that the world, as we know it,
exists ‘out there’ independently of human consciousness:
and mentalist views, that think the world is purely a con-
struction of the mind’’. Originally devised by Husserl, the
notion of going ‘‘back to the things themselves’’ allowed
philosophers to suspend theoretical judgement about
questions of the nature of reality to focus on how phe-
nomena essentially appear and are experienced—the Greek
meaning for phenomenon (phainomenon) is ‘‘that which
appears’’. In addition, Husserl’s approach ‘‘elevated the
phenomena of everyday life (what he later called Lebens-
welt—the lifeworld) to the same dignity, as matters for
rigorous study, which Kant had bestowed only on the
objects of natural science’’ (Hinchman & Hinchman,
1984:188). Martin Heidegger was initially a student of
Husserl and later his assistant at Freiburg University.
Whilst very much influenced by Husserl, Heidegger took
phenomenology in a different direction, arguing that
through its focus on essential structures of consciousness,
Husserlian phenomenology risked inadvertently reinforc-
ing Cartesian mind–body dualism. Heidegger thus advo-
cated the basis of his own phenomenology as one of
interpretation of experience and explication of the meaning
of being.
Despite their differences, Arendt was greatly influenced
by the thinking of Heidegger and his ‘‘phenomenology of
being’’. She is regarded as one of a number of ‘‘second-
generation phenomenologists’’, including Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas, who developed their own approaches
by critically working through the ‘‘first-generation phe-
nomenologists’’, Husserl and Heidegger. According to
Parekh (1981), one of the main objectives of The Human
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Condition, regarded by many as Arendt’s magnus opus,
was to provide a more satisfactory phenomenology of the
human activities that are relevant to politics. In this respect,
she is credited with the politicization of Heideggers’
thought (Marchart, 2007). Adopting a phenomenological
method, Arendt sought to uncover and ‘‘make available the
objective structures and characteristics of political being-
in-the-world as distinct from other forms of experience’’
(Yar, 2000:20).
Post-foundationalism and the ‘‘Political Difference’’
In his quest to put being at the heart of philosophical
inquiry, Heidegger in ‘‘Being and Time’’ distinguishes
between the ontic level of beings as entities and the onto-
logical level of being, understood as the fundamental
structures of human existence (Heidegger, 2010). In
philosophical thought, this is referred to as the ontological
difference and it is from this that post-foundational political
thought and the political difference is derived. Adherents of
post-foundational thinking essentially contest the premise
that there is an ultimate foundation upon which society
and/or politics can be grounded. The notion of foundations
is not rejected outright (that would represent an anti-
foundationalist perspective), rather, in rejecting an ultimate
foundation, post-foundationalists ascribe to the notion of
contingent grounds in the plural. For political theorists,
such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe such a per-
spective formed the basis of their shift from an essentialist
Marxist position grounded in economic determinism (and
thus denying the autonomy of the political), to an under-
standing of social change and radical democracy as being
contingent and best conceived in terms of a plurality of
struggles: ‘‘The multiplication of political spaces and the
preventing of power in one point are then preconditions of
every truly democratic transformation of society’’ (Laclau
& Mouffe, 2001:178). The idea of the absence of an ulti-
mate foundation upon which society and/or politics can be
grounded created a lacuna in terms of theorizing social and
political change within a post-foundationalist framework
and it was the political difference, mirroring Heidegger’s
ontological difference, which served to address this gap. Of
the political difference, Marchart (2007:5) says:
As difference, this difference presents nothing other
than a paradigmatic split in the traditional idea of
politics, where a new term (the political) had to be
introduced in order to point at society’s ‘ontological’
dimension, the dimension of the institution of society,
while politics was kept as the term for the ‘ontic’
practices of conventional politics (the plural, partic-
ular and, eventually, unsuccessful attempts at
grounding society).
Arendt, along with the political theorist Carl Schmitt,
are recognized as two of the pre-eminent theorists of the
nature of the political. For Arendt, it is the free association
of people in their plurality which brings the political into
being. For Carl Schmitt, it is an outside enemy or antag-
onism which is constitutive of the political. On the dis-
tinction between the Arendtian and Schmittian
perspectives, Marchart (2007:40) says,
…the associative trait of the political is not meant to
indicate merely the phenomenon of political collec-
tivity (all politics is collective), but the way in which
the collective is established. This is where the main
difference lies: seen from an Arendtian angle, people
in their plurality freely associate within the public
realm by their care for the common. Seen from a
Schmittian angle, though, a collectivity is established
through an external antagonism vis-à-vis an enemy or
constitutive outside, that is, by way of dissociation.
From an Arendtian perspective, it is not just that people
associate freely that constitutes the mark of the political but
crucially that this takes place across a plurality of beliefs
and perspectives. It is through this process that a public
realm, forever contingent, is constituted. Central therefore,
to Arendt’s conceptualization of the associative political is
this notion of ‘‘plurality’’ and it is her phenomenological
understanding of it as the foundation of the political to
which I now turn.
Plurality as the Foundation of ‘‘The Political’’
According to Canovan (1992), Arendt’s inquiry into the
nature of the political as a force for good was driven by her
experiences of totalitarianism, elucidated in her first book
On the Origins of Totalitarianism. Against a deterministic
totalitarianism underscored by the hubristic notion that
‘‘everything is possible’’, is set an understanding of human
freedom which is more contingent, spontaneous, plural and
limited. It is through constant reflection and attention to
plurality as a phenomenon that Arendt’s understanding of
the nature of the political is grounded and developed. In her
book entitled ‘‘Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah
Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity’’, Sophie Loidolt
provides a detailed interpretation and analysis of the phe-
nomenological approach adopted by Arendt. Loidolt’s
phenomenological understanding adds a new layer and
depth of interpretation to Arendt’s perspective on plurality.
According to Loidolt (2018:2),
….one can gain a full understanding of the nature and
transformative force of plurality only if one con-
ceives of it in a phenomenological context. Plurality
is not something that simply is, but essentially
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something that we have to take up and do. Therefore,
it manifests itself only as an actualization of plurality
in a space of appearances.
Plurality therefore is understood not just as a statement
of fact in terms of numbers, it is also crucially an inter-
subjective phenomenon which is actualized in the interplay
of multiple perspectives. There are a number of intercon-
nected ideas and concepts which flow from this phe-
nomenological conception of plurality. First, plurality and
human action are inextricably linked as the foundation of
Arendt’s conception of the political. In her analysis of the
vita activa or active life in The Human Condition, Arendt
makes a distinction between action, on the one hand and
labour and work, on the other. It is beyond the scope of this
article to look in detail at the distinction between each of
these human activities, but essentially Arendt argues that
action constitutes the most important category of human
activity because it is through action that the equality,
uniqueness and difference of each human being have the
potential to be realized. It is in making oneself known, both
individually and collectively, through words and deeds in
the presence of others, that new beginnings, initiatives and
capacities for freedom are made possible. Arendt refers to
the phenomenon of natality, the birth of every individual,
as being the basis of this promise and potential of a new
beginning.
Second, and following on from the first point, Arendt
conceives of power as the capacity to act in concert. Power
is understood as a human creation, a collective achieve-
ment, brought about through the joining together of a
plurality of actors for a common political purpose (Pas-
serin, 1994). For Arendt power is ‘‘…. the ‘we’ that
emerges from a constant readiness to act together, rising
from an intense mode of communication and directedness
at each other’s actions …….its unity is constituted through
ongoing personal interaction and attention’’ (Loidolt,
2018:226). This conception of power is very different to
what Arendt referred to as the command-obedience model,
which ‘‘equates power with the rule of law and presupposes
that the paradigmatic power relation is that by which a
sovereign imposes his will on his subjects’’ (Allen,
2002:132).
Third, it is the capacity to act in concert that ‘‘keeps the
public realm, the potential space of appearance between
acting and speaking men, in existence’’ (Arendt,
1998:179). In terms of Arendt’s phenomenological
methodology, the concept of ‘‘appearance’’ is highly sig-
nificant. In the Human Condition, she says ‘‘For us,
appearance—something that is being seen and heard by
others as well as by ourselves—constitutes reality’’
(Arendt, 1998:50). For Arendt, therefore, reality is consti-
tuted through pluralized appearance and this is most
marked in action with others through the activity of speech
and deeds. This is what constitutes the potential space of
appearance or public realm between people. Such spaces of
appearance, Arendt maintains, are not permanent, but are
continually created and recreated by action.
Finally, in her phenomenological analysis of actualized
plurality, Loidolt (2018:154) highlights the ‘‘irreducible
uniqueness of each person in the mode of togetherness’’.
Loidolt’s claim is that Arendt’s conception of plurality
insists upon the individual finding meaning through action
with others. Loidolt (2018:155) says,
A phenomenology of plurality does not aim at a
neutral description of all possible forms of collec-
tivity but focuses instead on the fact that being plural
is something that must explicitly be realized and
defended against all other forms of collectivity that
swallow individuality.
This is an important aspect which is often overlooked in
discussion about collective action. It emphasizes the Kan-
tian notion of the importance of human beings being
treated as ends in themselves, rather than means to
achieving a particular end. It is particularly relevant to CO
where tensions can sometimes exist between achieving a
balance between action, so that it is not simply seen as an
end in itself, and investing sufficient time in developing the
relational culture which will help sustain the organization
over time and enable people to find meaning in their
individual and collective involvement.
In concluding the first part of the article, the ‘‘political
difference’’ and the notion of plurality provide important
reference points for thinking about the role of civil society
in advancing a radical understanding of democratic politics
and of the distinctive political nature and character of
community organizing in contributing towards this. Civil
society in its plurality and diversity has a critical role to
play in ensuring that the contingency and groundlessness of
the political acts as a necessary counterpoint to the ten-
dency in politics for over-determination based upon an
understanding of ‘‘the premise of society as a sutured and
self-defined totality’’(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001:111). The
two realms of ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘the political’’ are not
mutually exclusive but inextricably linked. It is not that the
political represents a separate, purer or superior realm to
politics, because in and of itself the political cannot exist
outside of the necessary, momentary and contingent
groundings that politics generates. Rather, the political as
ontological, which as Heidegger posits never appears as
such, can be understood ‘‘as the grounding and instituting
moment of the social, constantly searching for its ontic
actualization via politics’’ (Marchart, 2011:966). For
Marchart, the implications of the political difference in
relation to democracy and democratic theory lie in the way
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that different regimes react to what he refers to as the
‘‘irresolvable contingency of social affairs’’. Mar-
chart (2011:967–968) says:
While in some the absence of an ultimate ground of
the social is negated, repressed, or disavowed, in
democracy this absence is institutionally accepted,
even promoted…….For this reason it makes sense to
define as democratic those symbolic arrangements of
a given society that help to accept the ultimate failure
of any attempt at grounding this very society, thus
bringing to presence the very absence of an ultimate
ground. Democracy openly turns the failure of
foundation – which in other regimes may remain a
hidden, dirty secret – into its very own ground.
Radical democratic politics is thus borne out of the
constant interplay of ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘the political’’ and the
contingent foundations that emerge from this interaction.
Community organizing as a civil society-led strategy,
provides an important means through which the interplay
of ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘the political’’ is brought into sharp
relief. In the second part of the article, the methodology
and ontology of community organizing as an expression of
the political are discussed, focusing on four phenomena—
the four ‘‘A’’s of association, action, appearance and
authenticity.
Hallmarks of the Political in Community
Organizing
As mentioned in the introduction CO represents a distinc-
tive civil society-led approach to building political agency
and contesting relations of power within society. As such
the approach has been understood and critiqued from a
number of different perspectives both conceptually and
politically. For example, on the left, theories of mobiliza-
tion associated with social movements have been applied
(Fisher & Kling, 1994; DeFilippis et al., 2010), as well as
concepts such as hegemony (Beck & Purcell, 2013), in
critically examining the strengths and limitations of CO
and the role of civil society in both maintaining but also
potentially contesting relations of power in society. On the
right, CO has been framed in terms of voluntarism and
civic duty. In the UK, such a perspective formed the basis
of David Cameron’s ‘‘Big Society’’ agenda, instituted as
part of the 2010 Coalition government’s political pro-
gramme and which included an undertaking to train and
deploy 5000 community organizers to ‘‘empower’’ local
communities.
Between more radical notions of contesting relations of
power in society, to more conservative ideas associated
with civic duty and so-called empowerment, CO has found
resonance across the political spectrum (Fisher & Dimberg,
2016). This broad appeal can be regarded as a strength;
however, it can also render somewhat problematic the
theoretical and political basis of the approach. An exis-
tential phenomenological perspective, based in Arendtian
post-foundational thinking and starting with the so-called
political difference, provides an alternative understanding
of the distinctive political nature of CO. In what follows,
Arendt’s phenomenological understanding of the political
and how it is constituted will inform an analysis of four key
features or phenomena of CO, what I term the four ‘‘A’’s of
association, action, appearance and authenticity. In exis-
tentialist and phenomenological terms, each of these fea-
tures represents the subjective, intersubjective and
relational basis of CO through which meaning is found in
being-together politically.
Association
Association as a concept has been central to democratic
theory from Alexis De Tocqueville in the nineteenth cen-
tury to Robert Putnam in more recent decades. In his the-
orization of the associational terrain, Warren (2001) draws
attention to the democratic effects of what De Tocqueville
referred to as secondary associations, in enabling people to
move out from their primary associations, i.e. their families
and households, to relate with, act and develop a sense of
interdependence with others. In this way, Warren (2001:30)
says,
‘‘associations provoke a civic consciousness and
displace narrow self-interest with a ‘self-interest
rightly understood’. In addition, associations cultivate
reciprocity and trust among individuals, enabling
them to accomplish tasks together they could not
manage alone’’.
The membership of a broad-based community organi-
zation is made up of a range of different secondary asso-
ciations or mediating institutions, including churches,
mosques, temples, synagogues, schools, unions and com-
munity organizations. These discrete associational forms
represent civil society institutions which are intermediate
between the private world of the family household and the
wider public world. Understood in political and sociolog-
ical terms, whilst they all may have an outward focus and
public orientation, they are essentially private, civil society
institutions with relatively limited power. The institution of
a broad-based community organization can be understood
in phenomenological and Arendtian terms as the actual-
ization of plurality, whereby a diverse range of institutions
within a given area agree to associate, to pay dues, to act in
concert and to build relational power. For example, initi-
ated in 1995 in East London, London Citizens, the largest
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broad-based community organization in the UK now
numbers over two hundred member institutions across the
whole of London.
The structure of London Citizens with member organi-
zations, organized in four chapters, covering, north, east,
south and west London, allows for different levels of
democratic participation and engagement by members at a
local, borough and city-wide level. Saul Alinsky, the
founder of community organizing, understood that whilst
on the surface the problems associated with poor commu-
nities were often presented in terms of needs and defi-
ciencies, the underlying causes and how they were to be
addressed was fundamentally to do with power. Alinsky’s
great insight was that in poor communities, institutions
such as faith groups, unions and other community-based
organizations could be brought together and harnessed to
build a more powerful broad-based institution. In the pro-
cess, radicalism and tradition could be combined in
building diverse broad-based coalitions rooted in the lives,
values and institutions of the poorest citizens (Ritchie,
2019).
In CO, a great deal of emphasis is placed on teaching
about power and the form of relational or associative power
which is built when local institutions join together to form
a broad-based community organization. In terms of the
associative and dissociative conceptions of the political,
mentioned earlier in relation to Arendt and Schmitt,
respectively, the primary impulse and substantive operative
mode of a broad-based community organization is that
which accords to the Arendtian associative tradition. As a
newly instituted political actor, committed to developing
associative power for public action, there is the potential to
generate antagonistic as well as agonistic relations. To be
political therefore, means to take seriously the antagonistic
dimension of the political but to also recognize its agonistic
dimensions and the potentially positive aspects of certain
forms of conflict (Mouffe, 2005).
As mentioned earlier, in giving ontological priority to
antagonism, theorists like Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto
Laclau, subscribe to the dissociative tradition of Carl
Schmitt on the nature and constitution of the political.
According to these theorists the political ‘‘we’’ is consti-
tuted by the ‘‘they’’, in other words the ‘‘constitutive out-
side’’ helps to form the identity of the ‘‘we’’. In contrast,
Arendt gives ontological priority to plurality and to the
constitution of the ‘‘we’’ from within rather than from
without, manifest in the commitment of a plurality of
actors joining together for a common political purpose. It is
not that Arendt denies the need for antagonism in acting
politically for social justice—her life and works testify to
that. Rather, in prioritizing the constitutive ‘‘we’’ from
within, Arendt emphasizes the autonomous nature of the
political and the conception of power as the capacity to act
in concert. In its understanding and teaching of power, CO
accords most closely to this Arendtian perspective.
There are echoes of the associative/dissociative tradi-
tions in the wider literature on community development, in
the distinction made between so-called consensus and
conflict-based approaches. In this regard CO, particularly
within the Alinskyan tradition, is often labelled a conflict-
based approach. The distinction between consensus and
conflict-based approaches is, in my view, too simplistic. In
reality, effective political engagement requires both the
potential for consensus and conflict, with the power of an
organization, understood in Arendtian terms as the ability
of people to act in concert, largely determining the extent
to which consensus and conflict-based approaches can be
employed tactically and strategically. Such an under-
standing, however, raises the question about the relation-
ship between ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘the political’’ discussed
earlier and the balance that can be achieved in CO between
both engaging episodically in power politics in order to
‘‘win’’ and achieve success on issues, and the longer term
and more enduring aim which is the development of the
political in keeping a plural and diverse alliance of asso-
ciations together in order to uphold the notion of building a
common life through the practices of democratic politics
(Bretherton, 2015). This is a difficult balancing act to
achieve and beyond the successes on a range of issues
including, in the case of London Citizens, affordable
housing, resettlement of refugees and most notably, the real
living wage, perhaps the greatest achievement is the fact
that so many IAF broad-based community organizations,
across a number of countries, have survived and flourished
as political entities over many decades.
Action
In her analysis of political agency and collective action in
On Revolution, Arendt focuses on the nature of the rela-
tionship between those who initiate action and those on
whose behalf the action is initiated. Arendt distinguishes
between pity and compassion, on the one hand, and soli-
darity on the other. She says,
It is out of pity that men ‘are attracted to les hommes
faibles’ (weak men, italics mine) but it is out of sol-
idarity that they establish deliberately, and as it were
dispassionately, a community of interest with the
oppressed and exploited…… solidarity though it may
be aroused by suffering, is not guided by it, and it
comprehends the strong no less the weak and poor
(1990, p.88).
At the heart of Arendt’s conceptualization of solidarity
is the idea of diverse equals acting together in a community
of mutual interest. In comprehending ‘‘the strong no less
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than the weak and poor’’, Arendt, I believe, draws attention
to the importance of authoritative public actors, capable of
inspiring public action through speech and deeds. This
resonates with the so-called iron rule of organizing in the
Industrial Areas Foundation, i.e. ‘‘never do for others what
they can do for themselves’’. In other words, people
through their participation in a broad-based community
organization grow and develop as leaders through speaking
and acting in the public realm.
According to Villa (2008), Arendt’s theory of political
action has a number of irreducible features, which,
amongst other things, include a pervasive frailty that comes
from constantly moving amongst a plurality of independent
actors; and related to this a ‘‘boundlessness’’ that comes
from the unpredictability of never really knowing what the
consequences of public action will be. Thus, as well as
being a doer, a public actor, Arendt maintains, is also a
sufferer in that the actor often does not reach the goal that
she originally envisaged. Indeed, due to its boundlessness
and unpredictability, the futility of action is always a very
real possibility. In considering the unpredictability of
action, Totschnig (2019:189) asks the question ‘‘if an actor
cannot know where her initiative will lead, what motivates
and guides her in her doings?’’. Totschnig maintains that
action must be guided by principles rather than goals. He
says,
Because of its generality, a principle can be shared by
a plurality of agents. Whoever you are, whatever your
station, you can partake in the realization of justice,
or charity, or honour. This is to say that only because
it is guided by principles can action be in concert. To
act with (or against) others means to be committed to
the same (or conflicting) principles (p.196).
In CO, the principles often referred to include social
justice, dignity, democracy, recognition, and in the words
of Alinsky (1989a:xiv) ‘‘a belief in people, a complete
commitment to the belief that if people have the power, the
opportunity to act, in the long run they will, most of the
time, reach the right decisions’’. On the point about
recognition, this is not recognition usually associated with
identity politics but rather the recognition that comes from
building sufficient power, alongside others, to claim a place
as actors in public life and to be recognized in the public
realm. Whilst the pressure to achieve goals and succeed in
action is always there, not least to sustain the membership,
momentum and funding of the organization, it is seen as
vitally important to develop a core of leaders and member
institutions who are committed to the underlying principles
which guide the action undertaken.
Another point that Totschnig raises in relation to the
unpredictability of action is the relationship between action
and the reaction to it. He says, ‘‘To act is to act with or
against other agents who will not simply yield to the ini-
tiative but rather react to it’’ (p.195). In this sense, the
action can be understood as the sum of the responses it
provokes with the prerogative resting with those who
respond (Thiele, 2009). In relation to London Citizens, a
good example of the unpredictability of action and the
reaction to it was provided by the announcement of a
‘‘National Living Wage (NLW)’’ by the UK Conservative
government in the 2015 budget. The announcement came
as a surprise to many, not least the organizers and leaders
within London Citizens who had driven the living wage
campaign for over 15 years. At one level, it represented
recognition and a significant victory in establishing a large
increase in the legal wage floor and the rate previously set
by the National Minimum Wage. At another level, it was a
blatant co-option of the ideas and practices of London
Citizens by the government. This caused a degree of con-
fusion, referred to by the Resolution Foundation, as a
‘‘terminological muddle’’, obfuscating the difference
between the lower government National Living Wage rate
and the higher Real Living Wage (RLW) rate determined
by the Living Wage Foundation, the independent body
which had grown out of the campaign waged by London
Citizens over so many years.
The notion that the ‘‘action is in the reaction’’ is an
important refrain in IAF training and lies at the heart of
Alinsky’s rules of power tactics, elucidated in ‘‘Rules for
Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals’’
(1989b). Whilst Alinsky’s provocative prose in which he
often talked in irreverent and polarized terms often drew
criticism from detractors, it can in itself be seen as a form
of action designed to elicit a reaction, which could be
turned to advantage. In a recent article, Fretz (2019)
highlights Alinsky’s irreverence, humour and comic vision
as being fundamental to the way in which he crafted a
philosophy and methods of community organizing that
invited ordinary people into the democratic process.
Understood in phenomenological and Arendtian terms, it
highlights Alinsky’s acute awareness that action ‘‘acts into
a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction
and where every process is the cause of new processes’’
(Arendt, 1998:190).
In relation to CO, authentic public action must be
grounded in an established relational culture and one of the
primary methods for establishing such a culture is the one-
to-one, or relational meeting. A one-to-one is essentially a
private conversation aimed at establishing the potential for
a public relationship and for actualizing public action. It is
regarded as the fundamental building block of CO and is
one of the core features of what it means to communicate
meaningfully with another human being. In ‘‘Roots for
Radicals’’, Chambers refers to it as the most radical thing
taught by the IAF. He defines it as:
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An encounter that is face-to-face – one to one – for
the purpose of exploring the development of a public
relationship…. A solid relational meeting brings up
stories that reveal people’s deepest commitments and
the experiences that give rise to them…. stories that
open a window into the passions that animate people
to act (Chambers, 2003:44).
Such an understanding resonates with Mills’ (1970)
correlation of ‘‘private troubles’’ and ‘‘public issues’’, the
relational meeting providing the mechanism through which
people’s narratives and stories translate to action. In his
analysis of Arendt’s ontology of action, Thiele places the
notions of story and narrative at the heart of Arendt’s
understanding of freedom and the meaning of action.
Thiele (2009) says,
As political actors, we demonstrate our freedom by
initiating stories that invite responses, just as our
individualities are announced by births that launch
the sagas of our lives. Political actors are not sover-
eign authors; they are characters in the midst of
composition. In a democracy, this fact not only
describes the nature of political action. It is meant to
inform the self-understanding of citizens and
statespeople.
Involvement in a broad-based community organization
allows for alternative individual and collective narratives to
be created. It is through action that public freedom is
expressed and new narratives fomented. Whilst the actions
undertaken may or may not be successful in achieving their
goals, the meaning and interpretation of action, including
the reaction to it, may change over time. In this way, the
stories and narratives generated through action with others
provide the basis for the constitution of individual and
collective meaning.
Appearance
In Being and Time, Heidegger draws on a classical con-
ception of phenomenon, whereby the phenomenon is
understood as that which shows itself or that which reveals
itself (Heidegger, 2010). According to Loidolt, Arendt
politicizes this understanding from the notion of appear-
ance for someone to worldly appearance for many. For
Arendt therefore, ‘‘to be real means to appear; to be a self
means to appear; to ‘be of the world’ means to funda-
mentally belong to the realm of appearance’’ (Loidolt,
2018:53). In this, Arendt, sets herself against a Platonist
perspective which holds that the world of forms is the
essential basis of reality and it is the task of the philosopher
alone, in the light of these true forms, to rule over the
conflicting opinions of citizens. According to Arendt, it
was from Plato onwards that philosophy and politics
‘‘parted company’’ (Kohn, cited in Villa, 2000:121) and it
was this, along with the perception of Heidegger as the
archetypal lone philosopher, which contributed to her
ambivalence of philosophy mentioned earlier.
In CO, this sense of appearing is closely linked to the
concepts of dignity and recognition, whereby it is through
public action that citizens become visible on a public stage.
Dignity and recognition can thus be understood in political
and intersubjective terms as qualities of esteem and respect
that appear between plural beings who act together in
concert. A phenomenological understanding of how the
actualization of plurality through public action helps to
constitute ‘‘spaces of appearance’’ provides important
insight into how dignity and recognition emerge through
struggle. In her analysis of undocumented immigrants in
the USA, Beltran draws on an Arendtian framework to
examine how through public action, in response to living
out their lives in the shadows, immigrants focused on
issues of dignity and recognition, rather than simply eco-
nomic concerns. In framing the undocumented as subjects
of natality, rather than necessity (through the process of
labour), Beltran argues that the 2006 immigration reform
protests across the USA are best understood as a moment
of initiation and an inaugural performance of the political.
She says, ‘‘By taking to the streets and claiming space and
rights, immigrants and their allies created relational spaces
of freedom and common appearance where none existed
before’’ (Beltran, 2009:597).
From an Arendtian perspective, there is a performative
aspect to this which takes on added meaning and signifi-
cance. Where action is understood as fragile and boundless,
those that enter and perform in the public realm, are in
Arendt’s eyes, worthy to be considered of greatness. As she
reminds us in The Human Condition, ‘‘Greatness can lie
only in the performance itself and neither in its motivation
nor its achievement’’ (1998:206). In this, Arendt sidelines
the instrumental priority often afforded to action in terms
of immediate results, instead drawing attention to the
ontological dimension of action in the way that subjectivity
is produced and transformed (Beltran, 2009). As an aside,
Boyte, a strong advocate of broad-based community
organizing, takes issue with Beltran’s Arendtian interpre-
tation, claiming that in focusing on ‘‘the performance
itself’’, Beltran ‘‘..sunders the roots of public actions from
the organizing work that led up to them’’ (Boyte, 2010,
p. 871). Whilst Boyte makes a valid point, based in the
distinction he draws between organizing and mobilizing, it
need not detract from a phenomenological understanding
about the importance and significance of appearance in CO.
To this end appearance in the sense of being visible and
being recognized publicly represents a central strategic aim
and tactical ploy of CO.
Voluntas
123
One important way that visibility and recognition are
achieved in CO is through large-scale assemblies. The
assembly provides both a means for the member institu-
tions to appear to themselves and thus substantiate their
ability to turn people out and act in concert, but also to
speak to power and to do public business. Highlighting the
role of the assembly as a display of ‘‘people power’’
Ritchie (2019) documents a London Citizens assembly in
2016, attended by over six thousand people in the run-up to
the 2016 London mayoral election. Ritchie (2019:29) says:
The focus on ‘‘people power’’ was on display at the
London Citizens’ Assembly. Its power comes from its
ability to unite citizens from a wide range of back-
grounds in long-term public relationships. The six
thousand citizens at the mayoral assembly were not
isolated individuals. All were members of one or
another of the 210 institutions that make up the alli-
ance. Most had been involved in the extensive pro-
cess of listening and negotiating that shaped London
Citizens’ specific proposals – in this case on afford-
able housing, the living wage, and safe passage for
refugees.
In a similar vein, Luke Bretherton in his analysis of
London Citizens, speaks of the spatial dimensions, both
geographic and symbolic, of democratic citizenship and the
importance of finding ways of reconstituting a place-based
politics through which citizens can learn how to appear,
participate and perform in public space. Of broad-based
community organizing, Bretherton (2015:156) says:
This work can be seen in how it: (1) respatializes and
renders visible an institutional and physical political
and civic life within its public performances; and (2)
trains people in how to conduct public relationships
within particular political terrains.
From a phenomenological perspective, ‘‘appearance’’
constitutes an important aspect of what it means to be
political. CO is based upon an understanding that for those
who lack power, being visible and being recognized are
central issues in themselves. To appear means to build
sufficient power with others to claim a public space and to
be recognized as legitimate public actors by allies and
potential adversaries alike.
Authenticity
Authenticity occupies a central place in existential thought,
albeit there are many different interpretations of the
meaning of authentic existence. This includes, amongst
other things, making meaning of one’s life out of a reality
which is meaningless (Sartre, 1992), being in touch with
one’s inner self (Kierkegaard, 1985), and facing up to one’s
death and the anxiety this provokes (Heidegger, 2010). It is
in public being-together that Arendt believes authenticity is
grounded. Unlike Heidegger who saw ‘‘the they’’ (das
Man), especially in public being-together, as absorbing the
‘‘who’’ of everydayness, Arendt maintained that is in acting
alongside others that the ‘‘who’’ of self-hood is disclosed.
This relates to the point made earlier about Arendt’s
insistence on the individual finding meaning through
action. However, as Loidolt (2018) points out in relation to
authentic and inauthentic realizations of the ‘‘we’’, it is not
just about the activity and its visibility, but also how it is
carried out. Thus, according to Arendt:
Power is actualized only where word and deed have
not parted company, where words are not empty and
deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil
intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not
used to violate and destroy but to establish relations
and create new realities (Arendt, 1998:200).
In the context of this article and the analysis of CO,
authenticity can be understood in terms of a tension and
struggle, individually and collectively with others, to enact
and give expression to values of social justice and
democracy. In reflecting on the nature of authentic action
for social justice, Edward Chambers, who succeeded
Alinsky as Director of IAF in 1972, talks about the tension
between ‘‘the world as it is’’ and ‘‘world as it should be’’.
He says:
…….it is the fate of human beings to exist in-be-
tween the world as it is and the world as it should be.
Reflective people of conscience are constantly and
painfully aware of the gap between our so-called
values and the facts of life in the everyday world
within which we operate……The tension between the
two worlds is the root of radical action for justice and
democracy (Chambers, 2003:29).
Similarly, in a recent article on faith-based community
organizations and how they contribute to progressive social
change, Delahanty (2020) talks about the tension that
progressive religious people often feel between the values
and moral convictions they proclaim and the struggle to
publicly validate such commitments in concert with others.
Referring to this as an ‘‘authenticity crisis’’ Delahanty
highlights ways in which participation in a faith-based
community organization can create a sense of personal
moral authenticity through engagement in collective
political action. He says:
Personal moral authenticity refers to the ambition to
develop, enact, and perform a moral identity that is
true to an enduring internal self, and to validate that
identity through interaction with others. It is
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simultaneously an individualized project that locates
agency within the self and a profoundly social
undertaking that depends on interactions with others
for its validation (Delahanty, 2020:1230).
The role of civil society is critical in providing the basis
for people to develop a strong sense of an authentic self
through a social commitment to collective action. As
‘‘political’’ problems are increasingly framed within the
social economy of necessity (Kirwan, 2013), Arendt’s
preoccupation with active citizenship and with the auton-
omy of the political is prescient, given the increasing
likelihood to find ourselves relegated to the status of clients
or consumers of various social services offered by the state
(Villa, 2008). Furthermore, with the advance of neoliber-
alism in recent decades, critiques of governmentality have
drawn attention to ways in which ‘‘community’’ has
increasingly been co-opted by government (Davies, 2007;
Rose, 1999). For example, I have previously highlighted
how, in the context of the UK, narratives of ‘‘partnership’’
and the ‘‘Big Society’’ have had a depoliticizing effect and
impact upon the practices of third sector organizations,
brought increasingly under the auspices of state manage-
rialism and commissioning processes (Bunyan, 2013).
Against this background, a phenomenological perspective
which focuses upon the meaning, significance and
authenticity of the political, reminds us of the importance
of developing and sustaining agonistic and politicized
models of community engagement.
Conclusion
The question of what it means to be political lies at the
heart of much of Hannah Arendt’s thinking. Starting from
the human condition of plurality, she develops her under-
standing of the distinctive characteristics of political being-
in-the-world (Yar, 2000), presented here as best understood
from an existentialist phenomenological perspective and
including the four ‘‘A’’s of association, action, appearance
and authenticity.
Community organizing provides an effective means for
people to be political and it is through the human phe-
nomena of associating, acting, appearing and struggling to
be authentic, that politicalness, or the quality of being
political is given expression. The joining together of sec-
ondary associations into a broad-based community orga-
nization allows for the possibility of a positive form of
associative or relational power to be created, as people in
their diversity and plurality, act together in concert for a
common good. To be authentically political means to
embrace the human condition of plurality and to commit to
its actualization in solidarity with others. Arendt’s insight
into the nature of the political and the expression this finds
in the example and practice of community organizing
reminds us of the significance of the political in shaping
individual self-hood and expressing collective public
freedom.
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